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CRIMINAL LAW-UNITED STATES V. HOLLINGSWORTH. THE 
ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE AND THE NEOPHYTE CRIMINAL-WHEN 
THE COMMISSION OF A CRIMINAL ACT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A 
CRIME 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 6, 1992, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Jacobson v. United States.1 In this case, the defendant's conviction 
for the illegal receipt of child pornography through the mails was 
reversed when the Court permitted the defendant to assert the en­
trapment defense. The majority in Jacobson2 upheld the defend­
ant's entrapment defense since the government failed to show that 
the defendant was predisposed to commit the criminal act prior to 
the government's intervention.3 Justice O'Connor argued in dissent 
that the Court's holding changed the entrapment doctrine,4 and 
that the Court's holding "has the potential to be misread by lower 
courts.. . . as requiring that the Government must have sufficient 
evidence of a defendant's predisposition before it ever seeks to con­
tact him."5 This assertion augured true when the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided United States v. 
Hollingsworth.6 
In Hollingsworth, the court of appeals relied on Jacobson and 
reversed the conviction of two alleged money launderers on the ba­
sis that they were entrapped by the government's sting operation.7 
The court concluded that, if the defendants, Hollingsworth and 
Pickard, were left on their own, they would not have engaged in any 
illegal activity.8 Therefore, the defendants were not "ready" to 
1. 503 U.s. 540 (1992). 
2. [d. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Blackmun, Jus­
tice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Thomas joined in this judgment. 
3. [d. at 542. The Court held that, as a matter of law, the government did not 
prove that the defendant was "predisposed, independent of the Government's acts and 
beyond a reasonable doubt." [d. 
4. [d. at 555-56. In her dissent, Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and by Justice Scalia (except as to part II). 
5. [d. at 557 (emphasis omitted). 
6. 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994). 
7. [d. A sting operation is an undercover police technique in which the law en­
forcement officer poses a!> a criminal to trap law violators. [d. at 1200. 
8. [d. at 1202. 
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commit the crime when the government commenced the sting oper­
ation. In dissent, Judge Ripple echoed the words of Justice 
O'Connor and indicated that the majority's decision in Hollings­
worth altered the entrapment defense significantly by adding a new 
and independent hurdle for the government to surmount. Judge 
Ripple labelled the new element of the majority's entrapment de­
fense as "readiness to act."9 
This Note examines whether the Court of Appeals for the Sev­
enth Circuit's decision in Hollingsworth has significantly altered the 
entrapment defense by either: (a) redefining the element of "pre­
disposition to· commit the crime" to require the component of 
"readiness;"lo or (b) by establishing "readiness" as a distinct and 
independent element of this defense. In order to perform this anal­
ysis, Part I of this Note begins by examining the evolution and his­
tory of the entrapment defense. The Supreme Court's decision in 
Jacobson will next be reviewed in detail. This discussion will pro­
vide a proper framework for the evaluation in Part II of the validity 
of the Hollingsworth court's interpretation of the entrapment de­
fense standard. In Part III, this Note concludes that the court in 
Hollingsworth erred in interpreting Jacobson, and that, while 
"readiness" is an important factor in the determination of predispo­
sition, it should not be considered as a distinct and independent 
element of the entrapment defense. The final section of t~t! Note 
proposes that courts utilize the "totality of the circumstances" test 
to evaluate a defendant's predisposition to commit a crime when a 
defense of entrapment is asserted. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Generally, entrapment occurs for the purpose of obtaining evi­
dence of an illegal act, when a law enforcement official or an under­
cover agent originates the idea of a particular crime in the mind of 
an individual.ll This inducement then causes the person to commit 
the crime, which the person is not otherwise disposed to do.12 Tra­
ditionally, the entrapment defense had two elements: first, that 
9. Id. at 1214. 
10. The entrapment defense is usually stated as having two elements: (1) govern­
ment inducement of the crime; and (2) a lack of predisposition on the part of the de­
fendant to engage in the criminal conduct. See, e.g., Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 
58,62-63 (1988). 
11. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540,548 (1992). 
12. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958); Sorrells v. United 
States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932); and see infra notes 16-48 and accompanying text. 
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there was a governmental inducement of the defendant to commit 
the crime;13 and second, that the defendant was not predisposed to 
commit the crime.14 
The determination of governmental inducement is usually clear 
on the facts of the reported case and is normally not disputed by the 
government,15 However, ever since this defense was first accepted 
by the Supreme Court,16 there has been general disagreement 
about the true definition and meaning of the term 
"predisposition."17 
Historically, it is has been a commonly held principle that only 
the blameworthy should be found criminally responsible for their 
actions.18 Acknowledging this axiom, the Supreme Court recog­
nized the need to distinguish between the "unwary innocent" and 
the "unwary criminal."19 The Court decided that an individual who 
is independently predisposed to commit a crime should be prose.: 
cuted, even if the criminal activity was induced by governmental 
intervention.20 However, the Court stated that the government 
may not "play[] on the weakness[] of an innocent party and be­
guile[] him into committing crimes which he otherwise would not 
have attempted."21 Therefore, the task for the Supreme Court in 
developing the entrapment defense was to formulate a test that 
would enable it to determine which individual was criminally culpa­
ble and which was genuinely "entrapped." 1\vo distinct tests were 
advanced: the objective test and the subjective test.22 The following 
13. Mathews, 485 U.S. at 62-63. 
14. Id. 
15. United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1215 (7th Cir. 1994). 
16. The first time that the Supreme Court considered the entrapment defense was 
in Sorrels v. United States, 2J37 U.S. 435 (1932). However, the entrapment defense was 
first presented before a federal court years earlier in Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 
412 (9th Cir. 1915). 
17. See generally, Brian Thomas Feeney, Note, Scrutiny For the Serpent: The 
Court Refines Entrapment Law in Jacobson v. United States, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 1027 
(1993) (an in-depth analysis of the subjective and objective definitions of 
predisposition). 
18. See Roger D. Groot, Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I (Without Scienter) 
Did Eat-Denial of Crime and the Entrapment Defense, 1973 U. ILL. L. REv. 254, 255. 
19. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958). 
20. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441. "It is well settled that the fact that officers or 
employees of the Government merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commis­
sion of the offense does not defeat the prosecution. Artifice and stratagem may be 
employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises." Id. 
21. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 376. 
22. See generally, Erich Weyand, Comment, Entrapment: From Sorrels To Jacob­
son-The Development Continues, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 293 (1993). 
306 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:303 
subsections provide a brief overview of the historical development 
and judicial treatment of these two distinct tests. 
A. The Evolution of the Entrapment Defense Doctrine 
In its first decision directly considering the entrapment de­
fense, the Supreme Court, in Sorrells v. United States,23 applied the 
subjective approach in its entrapment analysis.24 In Sorrells, gov­
ernment agents used significant psychological persuasion and multi­
ple requests. before the defendant reluctantly acquiesced to sell 
them prohibited alcohol.25 The Court agreed that the defendant 
was "entrapped" and stated that law enforcement officials exceed 
their authority when they "implant in the mind of an innocent per­
son the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its 
commission in order that they may prosecute."26 Thus, Chief Jus­
tice Hughes examined the predisposition of the defendant as well as 
whether there was the presence of any unlawful intent on the part 
of the defendant. 
In his concurrence in Sorrells, Justice Roberts disagreed with 
the focus of the majority's analysis and suggested that the Court 
should have focused solely on the government's conduct in deter­
mining the issue of entrapment.27 In advocating the objective ap­
proach, Justice Roberts felt that the judicial system should not 
condone outrageous law enforcement techniques even if the de­
fendant was predisposed to commit criminal acts. Justice Roberts 
reasoned that "[e]ntrapment is the conception and planning of an 
offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one 
who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persua­
sion, or fraud of the officer."28 
The Supreme Court next examined the entrapment defense in 
Sherman v. United States.29 · In his majority opinion, Chief Justice 
Warren declared that entrapment is established as a matter of law 
23. 'lf37 U.S. 435 (1932). 
24. Id. Sorrells dealt with law officials' attempts to discover individuals illegally 
selling alcohol. In this case, the defendant was convicted under the National Prohibi­
tion Act. Id. at 438-41. . 
25. Id. at 440. 
26. Id. at 442. 
27. Id. at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring). 

'lf3. Id. at 454 (Roberts, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 

29. 356 U.S. 369 (1958). Sherman involved a defendant who was convicted for 
selling narcotics to a government informer. The defendant initially resisted the agent's 
requests for drugs, but, after numerous pleas, he finally sold the drugs to the agent and 
was arrested. Id. at 373. 
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when the government agent originated the criminal design, planted 
it in the mind of an innocent defendant, and as the result of the 
urging of the government agent, the defendant subsequently com­
mitted the crime.30 Therefore, as in Sorrells, the Court relied on 
the subjective state of mind of the defendant as it related to his 
willingness to commit the illegal act. 
Justice Frankfurter concurred in Sherman but advocated the 
use of the objective approach. In criticizing the subjective ap­
proach, Justice Frankfurter explained that "[t]he courts refuse to 
convict an entrapped defendant, not because his conduct falls 
outside the proscription of statute, but because, even if his gUilt be 
admitted, the methods employed on behalf of the Government to 
bring about conviction cannot be countenanced."31 The approach 
advocated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells and Justice Frankfurter in 
Sherman is that the Court must focus its examination on the police 
conduct that induced, aided, or encouraged the commission of the 
illegal act without considering the specific state of mind of the 
defendant.32 
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Russell v. United States.33 
In Russell, the defendant was convicted of purchasing phenyl-2­
propanone, an ingredient necessary in the manufacture of 
methamphetamine, from an undercover law enforcement agent. 
The Court, in rejecting the defendant's entrapment defense, held 
that governmental conduct is irrelevant to the determination of en­
trapment, once predisposition has been established.34 Therefore, 
the Warren Court affirmed the use of the subjective approach. 
In Hampton v. United States,35 the Court reaffirmed that the 
subjective approach was the appropriate analysis for determina­
tions of entrapment.36 The Court held that governmental conduct, 
no matter how outrageous or onerous, did not factor into the en­
30. Id. at 372. See also United States v. Dougherty, 810 F.2d 763, 769 (8th Cir. 
1987) (discussing the requirements necessary for a finding of entrapment as a matter of 
law). 
31. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
32. See Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REv. 163, 171-72 
(1976). 
33. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). 
34. Id. at 436. However, the Court in Russell also hinted at the fact that they 
might reverse a conviction if the government's tactics were so outrageous as to violate 
the Due Process Clause. Id. at 431-32. 
35. 425 U.S. 484 (1976). In Hampton, the defendant was charged with selling 
narcotics to an undercover government agent. Id. at 484-85. 
36. Id. at 488. 
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trapment defense of a predisposed defendant.37 
Predisposition has been called the principal element of the en­
trapment defense,38 and lower courts have wrestled with the prob­
lem of properly defining this requirement.39 The issue of 
predisposition focuses on whether "the defendant was an 'unwary 
innocent' or, instead, an 'unwary criminal' who readily availed him­
self of the opportunity to perpetrate the crime."40 Thus, the 
Supreme Court deemed the predisposition requirement to be essen­
tial in order to bar the use of the entrapment defense by defendants 
who would have committed the crime even without government 
intervention.41 
The courts have interpreted the predisposition element as hav­
ing several distinct meanings. The Supreme Court has stated that a 
defendant's ready response cannot in itself be enough to establish 
predisposition and that some additional factor is required.42 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit indicated 
that a "willingness," in the sense of being psychologically prepared 
to commit the crime, is necessary for the entrapment defense to 
fail.43 Some courts of appeals have even devised multi-prong tests 
to facilitate the determination of a criminal predisposition.44 
37. Id. at 488-89. "The defense that the government's conduct was so outrageous 
as to require reversal on due process grounds is often raised but is almost never success­
ful. No Supreme Court case and only two court of appeals opinions have set aside 
convictions on that basis." United States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853, 857 (10th Cir. 1984). 
See, e.g., United States v. 1\vigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978); Greene v. United States, 
454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971). 
The subjective approach was reaffirmed by the Court in Mathews v. United States, 
485 U.S. 58,66 (1988), as the proper test for ascertaining the validity of the entrapment 
defense. In Mathews, Justice Brennan indicated that he bowed to stare decisis and ac­
cepted the Court's choice of the subjective approach. However, many states have de­
cided to adopt the objective approach of determining entrapment for state cases. See, 
e.g., State v. Zaccaro, 574 A.2d 1256, 1263 (Vt. 1990); People v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947, 
956 (Cal. 1979). 
38. United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1214 (1994) (citing Russell v. 
United States, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973». 
39. Compare Commonwealth v. Miller, 282 N.E.2d 394,400 (Mass. 1972) (adopt­
ing the subjective approach for the predisposition analysis); State v. Decker, 14 S.W.2d 
617,620 (Mo. 1929) (adopting the subjective approach for the predisposition analysis) 
with People v. Thrner, 210 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Mich. 1973) (adopting the objective ap­
proach for the predisposition analysis); People v. Moran, 463 P.2d 763, 766 (Cal. 1970) 
(adopting the objective approach for the predisposition analysis). 
40. Mathews, 485 U.S. at 63. 
41. Russell v. United States, 411 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1973); Sorrells v. United States, 
287 U.S. 435,441 (1932). 
42. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553 (1992). 
43. United States v. Ulloa, 882 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1989). 
44. Compare United States v. Blackman, 950 F.2d 420,423 (7th Cir. 1991) (five 
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From the Supreme Court's first recognition ofthe entrapment 
defense in Sorrells to the Court's decision in Mathews, the entrap­
ment defense doctrine had greatly changed.45 During this period, 
the concept of predisposition evolved from being simply a pertinent 
factor in the entrapment analysis46 to the controlling question of 
whether the defendant was a person otherwise innocent, who was 
induced by the government agents to commit the crime.47 In 1992, 
in Jacobson v. United States,48 the Supreme Court recognized that, 
notwithstanding this doctrinai'evolution; the appellate courts varied 
in their analyses of the entrapment defense and that the elements of 
this doctrine required further clarification. 
B. Jacobson v. United States49 
In Jacobson v. United States,50 the Supreme Court attempted to 
clarify the concept of predisposition. Keith Jacobson, a 56 year-old 
part test used to determine predisposition) with United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674, 
687-88 (8th Cir. 1985) (ten part test used to detennine predisposition), rev'd on other 
grounds, 476 U.S. 734 (1986). The test adopted by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit includes the following factors: 
(1) the character or reputation of the defendant; (2) whether the suggestion of 
criminal activity was originally made by the government; (3) whether the de­
fendant was engaged in criminal activity for profit; (4) whether the defendant 
evidenced reluctance to commit the offense, overcome by government persua­
sion; and (5) the nature of the inducement or persuasion offered by the 
government. 
Blackman, 950 F.2d at 423. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit gave a more elaborate 
list of elements to be considered in examining predisposition: 
(1) whether the defendant readily responded to the inducement offered; (2) 
the circumstances surrounding the illegal conduct; (3) the state of mind of a 
defendant before government agents make any suggestion that he shall com­
mit a crime; (4) whether the defendant was engaged in an existing course of 
conduct similar to the crime for which he is charged; (5) whether the defend­
ant had already fonned the design to commit the crime for which he is 
charged; (6) the defendant's reputation; (7) the conduct of the defendant dur­
ing negotiations with the undercover agent; (8) whether the defendant has re­
fused to commit similar acts on other occasions; (9) the nature of the crime 
charged; and (10) the degree of coercion present in the instigation law officers 
have contributed to the transaction relative to the defendant's criminal 
background. 
Dion, 762 F.2d at 687-88 (citations and quotations omitted). 
45. For a discussion on the evolution of the entrapment defense, see supra notes 
23-44 and accompanying text. 
46. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
47. Russell v. United States, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). 
48. 503 U.S. 540 (1992). 
49. 503 U.S. 540 (1992). 
50. Id. 
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Nebraska farmer, was charged with violating the provisions of the 
Child Protection Act51 for receiving pictures of minors engaged in 
sexual conduct. Jacobson claimed that "the Government entrapped 
him into committing the crime through a series of communications 
from undercover agents during the 26 months before his arrest."52 
The government initiated the investigation after it learned that 
Jacobson previously had legally received a magazine depicting nude 
preteen and teenage boys in the mail. 53 In the ensuing "2 112 years, 
repeated efforts by two Government agencies, through five ficti­
tious organizations and a bogus pen pal"54 were carried out to in­
duce Jacobson to break the law. In reversing Jacobson's conviction, 
the Supreme Court held that the government had failed to prove 
that the defendant was independently predisposed to commit the 
crime.55 
In its analysis, the Court noted that "the Government had no 
evidence that petitioner had ever intentionally possessed or been 
exposed to [illegal] child pornography ... other than [from] the 
Government."56 The Court conceded that Jacobson had become 
predisposed to break the law aftertwo and one half years of induce­
ment, but that the Government had failed to prove that Jacobson's 
predisposition was "independent and not the product of the atten­
tion that the Government" had directed towards him.57 The Court 
stated that" 'the Government [may not] pla[y][sic] on the w~aJpless 
of an innocent party and beguil[ e] him into committing crimes 
which he otherwise would not have attempted. "'58 The Court held 
that when a defendant raises the defense of entrapment, the burden 
falls on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the defendant was predisposed to perpetrate the illegal act prior to 
being approached by the undercover agents.59 Justice White con­
cluded his majority opinion by remarking: "When the Govern­
51. Child Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 98·292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984). Specifically, 
Jacobson was said to have violated the federal child pornography law, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(a)(2)(A) (1990). 
52. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 542. 
53. Id. at 542-43. Within three weeks of Jacobson's receipt of these magazines, 
BARE Boys I and BARE Boys II, the law relating to child pornography changed. Con­
gress made it illegal to receive through the mail sexually explicit depictions of children. 
[d. 
54. [d. at 543. 
55. [d. at 542. 
56. [d. at 546. 
57. [d. at 550. 
58. [d. at 553 (quoting Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958)). 
59. The majority stated that the premise that the suspect must be predisposed 
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ment's quest for convictions leads to the apprehension of an 
otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his o~n devices, likely 
would never run afoul of the law, the courts should intervene."60 
As previously noted, Justice O'Connor dissented for several 
reasons. First, she believed that the defendant was predisposed to 
commit the crime because "[Jacobson] needed no Government 
agent to coax, threaten, or persuade him; no one played on his sym­
pathies, friendship, or suggested that his committing the crime 
would further a common goOd."61 Thus, Jacobson was not only will­
ing to commit the crime, but was also enthusiastic to do so. Sec­
ondly, Justice O'Connor also criticized the Court for changing the 
entrapment defense and holding that the "Government must [now] 
prove not only that a suspect was predisposed to commit the crime 
before the opportunity to commit it arose, but also before the Gov­
ernment came on the scene."62 Justice O'Connor believed that 
Jacobson's predisposition was clearly demonstrated by his ready 
complaisance and the absence of any reluctance to perpetrate the 
crime. She argued that the rule set down by the Court would im­
pede future undercover sting operations, as the government would 
be prohibited from "advertising the seduction of criminal activity 
for fear of generating a predisposition in its suspects. "63 Justice 
O'Connor's concerns soon materialized, when the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit relied on Jacobson in United States v. Hol­
lingsworth64 and held that two alleged money launderers had been 
entrapped as a matter of law and should have been acquitted of 
money laundering.65 
II. UNITED STATES V. HOLLINGSWORTEP> 
This section of the Note is divided into four subsections. First, 
before any contact with a government agent is so embedded in criminal jurisprudence 
that the government conceded this point at oral argument. Id. at 549 n.2. 
60. Id. at 553-54 (emphasis added). This last sentence was highlighted by the 
court in Hollingsworth as the basis for its interpretation of the elements of the post­
Jacobson entrapment defense doctrine. United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 
1198 (7th Cir. 1994). 
61. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 554 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
62. Id. at 557. Justice O'Connor feared that the majority's new rule would re­
quire law enforcement officials to have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
before they began an investigation. Note that the majority directly denied this allega­
tion in its opinion. See id. at 549 n.2. 
63. Id. at 557. 
64. 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994). 
65. Id. at 1198. 
66. 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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a description of the pertinent facts of the Hollingsworth case is 
presented. Second, the district court's opinion is summarized. The 
third subsection provides a detailed analysis of the Court of Ap­
peals for the Seventh Circuit's holding in Hollingsworth. The con­
cluding subsection presents a comprehensive review of the opinions 
offered by the court's dissenting judges. 
A. Case Facts 
In order to increase their income, the defendants, Hollings­
worth, a farmer, and Pickard, a dentist, decided to become interna­
tional financiers.67 They formed a Virgin Islands corporation, 
CIAL, to conduct international banking. Within a short period, the 
business was in poor financial shape, and the defendants decided to 
sell their Grenadian banking license to raise additional working 
capital.68 They advertised this sale in U.S.A. Today.69 
The defendants were contacted by J. Thomas Rothrock, a 
United States Customs agent, who thought that this advertisement 
might be a front for illegal money laundering.7o On his second at­
tempt to contact Pickard,71 Rothrock told Pickard that he had 
money from an organization and wanted to deposit it offshore. Ini­
tially, Pickard suggested several "legal" methods by which Roth­
rock could achieve his stated goals, but later suggested that 
Rothrock could either "structure"72 a large cash deposit to avoid 
federal reporting requirements, or he could deposit the money 
outside the United States. Pickard later retracted this second op­
tion, stating that it was illegal.73 After being contacted several 
67. [d. at 1200. 
68. [d. 
69. USA TODAY, May 4, 1990, at 5D (classified advertisement). The advertise­
ment read: "International Class 'A' Banking License available for immediate sale. Un­
used but fully operational. State of Grenada. All fees paid. US $29,950 complete. Bill 
at 800-262-2465." Id. 
70. J. Thomas Rothrock was a United States customs agent based in Indianapolis, 
Indiana, who, on the date of the USA Today ad, was attending a money laundering 
symposium. Knowing that foreign banks are sometimes involved in money laundering 
schemes, Rothrock assumed that someone who wanted to sell one might also be inter­
ested in money laundering. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1200. 
71. The first time that Rothrock called Pickard and Hollingsworth he left a 
message, but the call was never returned. Rothrock succeeded in contacting the de­
fendants with his second telephone call. Id. 
72. "Structuring" money is the term used for taking large sums of money, break­
ing them down into sums of less than $10,000, and depositing them in different banks in 
order to avoid federal banking reporting regulations. The court found no evidence that 
Pickard knew that this was an illegal act. [d. at 1209. 
73. [d. at 1201. 
1995] THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE AND THE NEOPHYTE CRIMINAL 313 
times by the defendants, Rothrock initiated "a formal investigation 
to determine the past and present unlawful activities of William 
Pickard."74 
After a period of setbacks that lasted approximately six 
months,75 Rothrock reestablished contact with Pickard and 
presented him with $20,000 of "sting money" that he had obtained 
from his superiors. Rothrock told Pickard that the money came 
from gun smuggling. Pickard then took the "sting money" and, in 
exchange, transferred money from his own account to that of Roth­
rock, charging Rothrock a fee of approximately ten percent for his 
services.76 When the defendants subsequently attempted to laun­
der another large sum of money for Rothrock, they were arrested.77 
The defendants were charged with money laundering and related 
offenses in violation of federallaw.78 
B. District Court Opinion79 
William Pickard filed a motion to have the indictment against 
him dismissed.80 He claimed that the government's conduct was 
outrageous and that the government had targeted him for investiga­
tion without a reasonable suspicion of previous illegal conduct.81 
Pickard also argued that the government had manufactured his 
crime through repeated requests and coercion.82 
The district court found no outrageous conduct on the part of 
the government officials83 and held that Pickard had failed to show 
74. Id. 
75. The investigation ground to a halt between August 20, 1990, and February 9, 
1991, as Pickard refused to deal with Rothrock on a transient basis. Id. 
76. Id. Subsequent transactions brought the total amount of money laundered by 
Pickard (and Hollingsworth) to $200,000. 
77. When Pickard was arrested he was carrying with him a false passport alleg­
edly issued by the non-existent Dominion of Melchizedek. Id. 
78. Id. at 1198. 
79. United States v. Pickard, 787 F. Supp. 155 (S.D. Ind. 1992). 
80. Id. at 156. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. The district court stated that "great leeway is granted law enforcement agents, 
and absent a violation of an independent constitutional right, governmental misconduct 
must be 'truly outrageous' before due process considerations will be implicated to pre­
vent a conviction." Id. at 157 (quoting United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1009 
(7th Cir. 1983». For a general discussion of the constitutional ramifications of "outra­
geous" government conduct, see Edward G. Mascolo, Due Process, Fundamental Fair­
ness, and Conduct That Shocks the Conscience: The Right Not To Be Enticed or Induced 
To Crime By Governments and Its Agents, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 1 (1984). 
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"with sufficient clarity" any evidence of "sentencing entrapment."84 
The district court disregarded the defendant's allegations that the 
government agents directed the relationship between the parties to 
money laundering and that they manipulated him into committing 
the offense. In rejecting this claim, the court stated that, since there 
was at least some evidence relating to Pickard's predisposition to 
commit the crime, a defense of entrapment as a matter of law must 
fai1.85 
C. 	 United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
Majority Opinion86 
After having been found guilty of money laundering and re­
lated offenses, Hollingsworth and Pickard appealed their convic­
tions to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The majority 
of the court felt that the government "turned two harmless, though 
weak, foolish, and in Pickard's case at least, greedy, men into 
felons" through the use of entrapment.8? The court of appeals, 
therefore, reversed the district court's holding and acquitted the 
two defendants.88 The court based the decision to acquit the de­
fendants on its analysis of Jacobson v. United States ,89 which it be­
lieved significantly altered the entrapment defense doctrine.90 
According to the Hollingsworth court, Jacobson demonstrated 
84. Pickard, 787 F. Supp. at 159. Pickard claimed that the government "inflated 
the seriousness of his offense" by not arresting him earlier and by supplying him with 
larger amounts of money. Id. at 158. 
85. In his motion to dismiss, Pickard also requested the court to compel the dis­
covery of internal government documents relating to his investigation since they were 
relevant to his claim of entrapment. The court denied this motion, stating that the 
entrapment defense deals solely with the defendant's predisposition and not with the 
behavior of the government. Id. at 159. For a general discussion on the entrapment 
defense, see supra part I. 
The defendants were later convicted of money laundering and related offenses. 
Pickard and Hollingsworth were sentenced to 24 and 18 months in prison respectively. 
After their convictions, a panel of the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court and 
held that the defendants had been entrapped as a matter of law. The government ap­
pealed this decision and a rehearing en banc was granted. See United States v. Hol­
lingsworth, 9 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1993), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, 27 F.3d 1196 (7th 
Cir.1994). 
86. 	 United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994). 
87. 	 Id. at 1202. 
88. 	 Id. at 1205. 
89. 	 503 U.S. 540 (1992). 
90. The court stated: "Cases both in this and in other circuits, besides the panel 
decision in this case, recognize that Jacobson has changed the landscape of the entrap­
ment defense." Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1198. See, e.g., United States v. Groll, 992 
F.2d 755,760 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Mkhsian, 5 F.3d 1306, 1310-11 (9th Cir. 
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that willingness to commit a criminal act is insufficient to prove pre­
disposition.91 If it was sufficient, then Jacobson, who showed no 
reluctance to buy the pornographic material, would have been con­
victed. The court also pointed to the last sentence of the Jacobson 
analysis as being of primary importance. In Jacobson, Justice White 
concluded his opinion by stating: "When the government's quest for 
convictions leads to the apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding 
citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would have never run 
afoul of the law, the courts should intervene."92 
The court in Hollingsworth interpreted this last sentence of 
Jacobson to mean that a court must look beyond the mental state of 
the defendant in order to determine predisposition.93 Thus, the ma­
jority in Hollingsworth stated that predisposition was made up of 
two components. The first component is a "positional" factor, 
while the second component represents the "dispositional force" of 
the defendant.94 The majority defined the "positional" component 
by indicating that the "defendant must be so situated by reason of 
previous training or experience or occupation or acquaintances that 
it is likely that if the government had not induced him to commit 
the crime some criminal would have done so. "95 The court felt that 
Hollingsworth and Pickard would not have been in the "position" 
to commit the criminal act if it were not for the government's inter­
vention.96 Since a criminal predisposition produced by government 
conduct cannot be used to frustrate the entrapment defense, the 
defendants had to be acquitted.97 
The majority also held that Jacobson stood for the proposition 
that, in order to defeat predisposition, the government had to prove 
that the suspect was predisposed to commit the crime before the 
government ever contacted the suspect, not before the government 
1993); United States v. Olson, 978 F.2d 1472, 1483 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. 
Ct. 1614 (1993). 
91. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1198. 
92. Id. at 1199 (citing Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54). 
93. Id. at 1199-1200. 
94. Id. The court denied that it had added a new element to the entrapment 
defense but argued that it had merely redefined predisposition according to the guide­
lines set down by the Supreme Court in Jacobson. Id. 
95. Id. at 1200. 
96. In discussing the "dispositional" component, the majority in Hollingsworth 
conceded that the defendants were willing to perpetrate the crime. However, the ma­
jority acquitted the defendants because the government could not establish that the 
defendants were in the "position" to commit the crime. Id. at 1202. For an analysis of 
the Hollingsworth decision, see infra part III. 
97. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1201. 
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proposed the commission of the illegal act to the defendant.98 The 
court found no evidence that Pickard or Hollingsworth had even 
considered the notion of engaging in money laundering before they 
were contacted by the government agent.99 Therefore, clear crimi­
nal predisposition could not be shown by the government. 
The court hypothesized that the outcome of the case would 
have been different if the defendants' business had been up-and­
running, since then they would have been in the "position" to en­
gage in the actus reus before the government arrived on the 
scene. lOO Thus, the entrapment defense fails when the government 
fUrnishes the opportunity to commit a crime to an individual who 
already had the idea for the illegal act but lacked only the present 
means to commit the crime.lOl However, since in this case Pickard 
and Hollingsworth were not "ready" to commit the crime, the court 
found that the defendants had been entrapped as a matter of law.102 
D.. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
Dissenting Opinions 
1. Judge Coffey's Dissentl03 
Judge Coffey asserted that the majority misinterpreted Jacob­
son.104 Judge Coffey stated that a valid defense to entrapment has 
two elements: governmental inducement and a lack of predisposi­
tion.lOS Judge Coffey believed that while Jacobson altered the en­
98. Id. at 1202. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S 540, 548 (1992) ("The 
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to 
commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by Government agents."). 
99. The evidence shows that, before being contacted by the government agent, 
the defendants' business was about to fail. The court found that since the defendants 
had "no background, resources, or connections ... [they] had no prayer of becoming 
money launderers without the Government's aid." Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1202. 
100. Id. 
10l. The court indicated that "[a] person who is likely to commit a particular type 
of crime without being induced to do so by Government agents, although he would not 
have committed it when he did but for that inducement, is a menace to society and a 
proper target of law enforcement." Id. at 1203. 
102. In the case of Hollingsworth, the government claimed that there could be no 
defense of entrapment, since Hollingsworth was induced by Pickard, a private citizen. 
However, the court adopted the doctrine of "derivative entrapment." The court held 
that there is a defense of derivative entrapment "when a private individual, himself 
entrapped [Pickard], acts as agent or conduit for governmental efforts at entrapment, 
the government as principal is bound." Id. at 1204. 
103. Id. at 1205 (Coffey, J., dissenting). 
104. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992). 
105. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1205 (Coffey, J., dissenting). See supra notes 11-48 
and accompanying text for a general discussion of the entrapment defense. 
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trapment defense by limiting the measures which the government 
agents could utilize in attempting to induce an otherwise "law-abid­
ing citizen" to violate the law, it did not strictly limit the focus of 
law enforcement undercover operations to "nonlaw-abiding citi­
zens."106 Therefore, according to Judge Coffey, "[w]hat is impor­
tant in this type of entrapment case is not the defendant's 'position' 
or 'readiness' but whether the Government went to great lengths to 
prepare the defendant to take the bait."107 Since, in the case at bar, 
the jury found the defendants' claim of entrapment to be without 
merit,108 this decision should have been upheld.109 
Under Judge Coffey's approach for determining predisposition, 
both defendants would fail to establish a lack of predisposition. 
The suggestion for criminal activity was initially made and pursued 
by the defendants.l10 The defendants were engaged in criminal ac­
tivity for profit and never showed any reluctance to commit the 
crime. In addition, the government did not have to offer the de­
fendants any inducement to commit the crime.1l1 The opportunity 
that was presented by the government was one that a law-abiding 
citizen would have refused.H2 
2. Judge Ripple's DissentH3 
Judge Ripple concluded that the majority in Hollingsworth ad­
106. Id. at 1206. 
107. Id. at 1211. 
108. The following evidence was presented to the jury to show that the defend­
ants knew that the activities that they were engaged in were illegal. The defendants: 
(1) obtained false passports; (2) repeatedly questioned Rothrock if he was a govern­
ment agent; (3) utilized a private investigator to carry out a background check on Roth­
rock; (4) frisked Rothrock; and (5) claimed to have "tap lights" on their telephones. Id. 
at 1210. 
109. Id. at 1209. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
stated in United States v. Blackman, "we must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the government and must affirm the conviction if we find that a rational 
trier of fact could have found the requisite predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt." 
United States v. Blackman, 950 F.2d 420, 423 (7th Cir. 1991). 
110. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1210 (Coffey, J., dissenting). 
111. Judge Coffey stated "the fact that [the defendants] created, planned and or­
ganized the whole system of laundering the currency, is more than enough evidence 
from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants were 
predisposed to commit the crime." Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Judge Easterbrook, in his dissent, joined in Judge Ripple's dissent except for 
the section criticizing the majority's acceptance of the doctrine of derivative 
entrapment. He also joined in Judge Coffey's opinion evaluating the evidence of this 
case. Id. at 1211-12. 
Judge Easterbrook stated that Jacobson did not alter the law of entrapment. He 
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ded a completely new element to the entrapment defense doctrine 
and "departed radically ... from the governing precedent of the 
Supreme Court of the United States."U4 Judge Ripple explained 
that the entrapment defense did not allow the dismissal of prosecu­
tions for "overzealous law enforcement."115 Instead, this doctrine 
should be utilized to protect an individual who commits a crime 
only as a result of governmental inducement.l16 
According to Judge Ripple, the majority's decision introduced 
a new and independent hurdle for the government to surmount. 
The government must not only establish that the alleged criminal 
was predisposed to commit the crime prior to the government's ini­
tial contact with the defendant, but now must also establish the 
"readiness" of the defendant.117 This alteration to the entrapment 
defense was found to run contrary to precedent, which has always 
held that predisposition concerns the suspect's state of mind or in­
tent.U8 The introduction of this new element into the entrapment 
defense was said to have changed both the doctrine and policy con­
cerns identified by the Supreme Court in past decisions.1l9 
The defendant's state of preparation or "readiness" prior to 
the presentation of the opportunity to commit the crime is no doubt 
relevant to the issue of predisposition. However, this state of readi­
ness is not an independent element of the defense.12o Judge Ripple 
considered "readiness" as "circumstantial evidence that is relative 
and probative evidence of whether the defendant was in fact predis­
posed to commit the offense. "121 
stated that "[i]solated phrases do not alter the law when the bulk of an opinion 
professes otherwise." Id. at 1212. Therefore, he believed that because Hollingsworth 
and Pickard were willing to break the law when given the opportunity, their defense of 
entrapment should fail. [d. at 1212-13. 
114. Id. at 1213. 
115. Id. at 1213-14. 
116. Id. at 1214 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973». In 
Russell, Justice Rehnquist stated: "the defense of entrapment ... was not intended to 
give to the federal judiciary a 'chancellor's foot' veto over law enforcement practices of 
which it did not approve." Russell, 411 U.S. at 435. 
117. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at1214. 
118. Id. (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932». See also 
supra part I (discussing the Supreme Court's adoption of the subjective test for the 
entrapment defense). 
119. See supra notes 11-48 and accompanying text for a general discussion of the 
entrapment defense. 
120. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1214-15 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
121. Id. at 1214. See also United States v. Shennan, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 
1952). In Sherman, Judge Learned Hand treated the concept of "readiness" as a factor 
to be used in the detennination of predisposition. Id. 
1995] THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE AND THE NEOPHYTE CRIMINAL 319 

A defendant's ready response to a government agent's invita­
tion to engage in crime has also been utilized to establish predispo­
sition.122 However, Judge Ripple asserted that the majority's 
decision altered the meaning of the term "ready" from referring to 
one who is "inclined" or "willing" to one who "is on the verge" of 
committing a crime.123 This alteration in the doctrine of the entrap­
ment defense places the Seventh Circuit at odds with all the other 
circuits.124 It is the only court to permit those defendants that de­
sire to commit a crime and end up perpetrating that crime to go 
unpunished "simply because, for whatever reason, [the defendant] 
does not have his act together when afforded an opportunity by an 
undercover agent."125 
Judge Ripple concluded that lacobson126 did not provide any 
support for the majority's requirement that the government must 
prove "that the defendant has sufficient aptitude and equipment to 
commit the crime. "127 Judge Ripple feared that disorganiZed neo­
phyte criminals would be able to take advantage of this require­
ment and hide behind the entrapment defense even though they 
enthusiastically engaged in the criminal act. Judge Ripple stated 
that this use of the entrapment defense contravenes both the intent 
of Congress and the teachings of the Supreme Court.128 
122. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1215 (Ripple, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Jacobson v. 
United States, 503 U.S. 540, 551 (1992); United States v. Dozal·Bencomo, 952 F.2d 
1246, 1251 (10th Cir. 1991) (utilizing defendant's readiness to respond to government 
inducement as part of the predisposition analysis). 
123. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1215·16 (Ripple, J., dissenting). See United States 
v. Ulloa, 882 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming the trial court's decision that the 
government does not have to show that the defendant was fully prepared to act or have 
the present physical ability to act in order to prove the existence of predisposition). 
124. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1002 (10th Cir. 
1992) (stating that predisposition may be established by evidence of the defendant'S 
readiness or willingness to commit the crime); United States v. Ventura, 936 F.2d 1228, 
1230-31 (11th Cir. 1991) (adopting the analysis that the defense of entrapment must fail 
in any case in which the defendant is willing). 
125. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1216 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
126. Jacobson v. United States. 503 U.S. 540 (1992). Judge Ripple suggests that 
Justice O'Connor's interpretation of Jacobson may be correct. In her dissent, Justice 
O'Connor read the majority's opinion in Jacobson "to require that the government not 
only establish that the defendant had a pre-existing propensity to engage in the underly­
ing conduct but also that he had the pre-existing propensity to violate the law in order 
to engage in that conduct." Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1216 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (cit­
ing Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 559-60). 
127. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1217 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
128. Judge Ripple concluded his dissent by criticizing the majority's acceptance of 
the doctrine of "vicarious [or derivative] entrapment." Judge Ripple stated that with­
out direct government contact with the defendant, there is no basis for an entrapment 
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III. ANALYSIS 
This Section analyzes the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit's decision in Hollingsworth in relation to Supreme Court 
precedent on the entrapment defense. It also evaluates the poten­
tially significant consequences that Hollingsworth may have on the 
law enforcement community. The Section concludes with a sugges­
tion of how the Supreme Court should resolve the conflict that ex­
ists among the courts in their implementation of the entrapment 
defense. 
A. Significance of United States v. Jacobson129 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated in Hol­
lingsworth that Jacobson substantially changed the framework of 
the entrapment defense.13o Jacobson can be thought to stand for 
three points. First, in order for the entrapment defense to fail, the 
government must show that the defendant was predisposed to com­
mit the crime independent of any government intervention.131 Sec­
ond, Jacobson clearly stands for the proposition that the defendant 
must be predisposed to commit the crime prior to any contact with 
law enforcement officers.132 
Finally, the third principle found in the Jacobson decision 
comes from the penultimate paragraph of the opinion. In this para­
graph, Justice White stated: "When the Government's quest for 
defense. Additionally, he invited the Supreme Court to determine if the majority's 
modification of the entrapment defense is appropriate. Id. at 1218-19. 
129. 503 U.S. 540 (1992). 
130. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1198. See also United States v. Groll, 992 F.2d 755, 
760 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that the Supreme Court's decision in Jacobson had 
"breath[ed] new life into the entrapment defense"); United States v. Olson, 978 F.2d 
1472, 1483 (7th Cir. 1992) (referring to "the new standard enunciated in Jacobson"). 
131. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 542. See also supra part I.B (summarizing the required 
elements of the entrapment defense). 
The Supreme Court stated that the government failed to meet its burden of proof 
and show that Mr. Jacobson would have ordered the pornographic materials without 
governmental interference. The Court pointed out that after the government agents 
arrested Jacobson, a search of his house found "no other materials that would indicate 
that petitioner collected or was actively interested in child pornography." Id. at 551-52. 
132. Id. at 553. In order to emphasize this point, the Court stated that "[i]n their 
zeal to enforce the law ... agents may not originate a criminal design, implant in an 
innocent person's mind the disposition to commit a criminal act, and then induce com­
mission so that the government may prosecute." Id. at 548 (citing Sorrells v. United 
States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932». The Supreme Court indicated that evidence that the 
suspect was predisposed to commit the crime prior to contact with the government can 
either Originate from evidence developed prior to the "sting" operation or from evi­
dence gained during the progression of the governmental investigation. Id. at 550. 
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convictions leads to the apprehension of an otherwise law~abiding 
citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would never run afoul 
of the law, the courts should intervene."133 Some commentators 
have suggested that this phrase is an attempt by the Court to look 
beyond the mental state or mens rea of the defendant in the deter~ 
mination of entrapment and to examine the "totality of the circum~ 
stances," including, but not limited to, the conduct of the law 
enforcement officers.134 These commentators have stated that the 
Supreme Court has therefore correctly recognized the objective ap­
proach as an important factor in the predisposition analysis.135 The 
majority in Hollingsworth relied on this same statement to substan­
tiate their inclusion of the "positional" or "readiness" approach to 
the doctrine of entrapment.136 
B. 	 Application of the Jacobson Analysis to United States v. 
Hollingsworth137 
The dissent in Hollingsworth accused the majority of redefin­
ing the entrapment defense and adding a new element of "readi­
ness" to the analysis.138 The majority responded that it merely 
redefined the element of predisposition according to the guidelines 
set down by the Supreme Court in Jacobson.139 Thus, to ascertain 
whether the court of appeals properly applied the Jacobson analysis 
to the facts in Hollingsworth, a close scrutiny of the legal reasoning 
utilized by the majority and dissent is required. 
In order to decide if the Hollingsworth defendants were en­
trapped under the Jacobson analysis, it must be determined 
whether the defendants were independently predisposed to commit 
the crime of money laundering before their contact with the gov­
ernment agents.140 The Hollingsworth majority went to great 
lengths to describe the defendants' lack of sophistication and finan­
cial acumen.141 The majority claimed to have examined the defend­
133. 	 Id. at 553-54. 
134. 	 See Feeney, supra note 17, at 1030; see also Weyand, supra note 22, at 299. 
135. 	 For a discussion on the objective approach, see supra part I.A. 
136. 	 United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1199 (7th Cir. 1994). 
137. 	 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994). 
138. 	 Id. at 1214. See also supra part II.D.2. 
139. Id. at 1199-1200. Chief Judge Posner wrote: "We do not suggest that Jacob­
son adds a new element to the entrapment defense - 'readiness' or 'ability' or 'danger­
ousness' on top of inducement. . .. Rather, the [Supreme] Court clarified the meaning 
of predisposition." Id. 
140.· Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 552 (1992). 
141. 	 Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1202. 
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ants' behavior both prior to and during the government operation 
and concluded that "Pickard and Hollingsworth had no prayer of 
becoming money launderers without the Government's aid. "142 
The court found that the defendants' banking business was in such 
financial upheaval that; if it had not been for the governmental in­
tervention, the business would have gone into bankruptcy.143 The 
court also indicated that, although the defendants were in drastic 
financial straits and could have perpetrated any number of criminal 
acts to raise capital, there was no proof that they even contem­
plated, let alone acted, to become money launderers.144 The major­
ity, however, focused only on the totality of the defendants' 
physical, psychological, and financial circumstances before the gov­
ernmental intervention and seemed to overlook Pickard's conduct 
once presented with the opportunity to break the law. 
In contrast, the dissenters focused their analysis solely on the 
defendants' conduct subsequent to the initiation of the governmen­
tal investigation. The dissent stated that the defendants not only 
showed little reluctance in accepting Rothrock's invitation to laun­
der money, but also actively pursued a relationship with him.145 
The dissent indicated that the reluctance that Pickard did demon­
strate was not a fear of breaking the law, but a fear that all 
criminals have: the fear of apprehension and conviction. In re­
sponse to this evidence, the majority conceded that the defendants 
were willing to perpetrate 'the crime, but stated that Pickard and 
Hollingsworth were "less willing than Jacobson had been to violate 
the federal law against purchasing child pornography through the 
mails."l46 For example, Pickard did demonstrate some reluctance 
to commit a crime when he retracted his own suggestion that he 
could illegally "structure" Rothrock's money.147 
The majority in Hollingsworth stated that the government had 
the burden "[of] prov[ing] beyond a reasonable doubt that a de­
fendant who raises a colorable defense of entrapment ... has not in 
142. [d. The court found that prior to his attempt to become an international 
financier, Pickard's past financial failures included: (a) movie theatres; (b) amusement 
parks; (c) apartment buildings; and (d) his wife's cookbooks. [d. . 
143. [d. 
144. Id. at 1200. 
145. Id. at 1207-08. Judge Coffey stated that "[c]ritical to the analysis of the de­
fendants' predisposition is that after [Rothrock's] first contact, it was the defendants 
who initiated four separate phone calls and aggressively pursued the relationship." [d. 
146. [d. at 1202. 
147. Id. at 1201. For a discussion of the Hollingsworth facts, see supra part II.A. 
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fact been entrapped."148 The majority found that the government 
did not meet the burden of showing that the defendant was predis­
posed before and independent of the government's intervention.149 
Before Jacobson, the Supreme Court held that a defendant's pre­
disposition was measured at the time that the law enforcement of­
ficer first suggested the crime to the defendant, not when they first 
came into contact.150 Under this standard, after Hollingsworth and 
Pickard had entered into a relationship with Rothrock, the govern­
ment would have been able to prove that they were predisposed to 
perpetrate a crime.151 Once presented with the opportunity and 
capital, Pickard and Hollingsworth were all too "ready" to become 
international money launderers. Therefore, under pre-Jacobson 
analysis, the fact that the defendants were willing and able to laun­
der money prior to the government's actual solicitation152 would 
suggest that their entrapment defense should fail. 
However, under the Jacobson analysis, the court must now de­
termine if the defendants were predisposed to commit the act 
before any government contact is initiated.153 This requirement 
would create a difficult burden on the law enforcement community, 
as law enforcement personnel now would be required to present 
sufficient proof that the defendant would be inclined to commit the 
crime before an investigation could even be commenced.154 Justice 
O'Connor suggested in Jacobson that "this rule has the potential to 
be misunderstood by lower courts as requiring that the law enforce­
ment officers must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
before the initiation of a 'sting' operation."155 
The majority in Jacobson held that Keith Jacobson had been 
148. Id. at 1203 (citing Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S 540 (1992». 
149. Id. at 1199. 
150. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 556 for a discussion of the Supreme Court's treat­
ment of the element of predisposition prior to Jacobson. 
151. The trial record demonstrated that in the first "significant" meeting between 
the parties, Pickard proposed an illegal act to Rothrock. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 
1207. 
152. The majority conceded that anyone is able to commit the act of money laun­
dering, as "all that [is] involved in the act [is] wiring money to a bank account desig­
nated." Id. at 1202. 
153. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 548-49. 
154. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1217 (Ripple, l, dissenting). 
155. Justice O'Connor feared that some !,:ourts would interpret the majority opin­
ion in Jacobson to require a finding of reasonable suspicion before the government 
could contemplate a sting operation. Justice O'Connor pointed out that the "Court 
denie[d] that its new rule [would] affect the run-of-the mill sting operations." Jacobson, 
503 U.S. at 557. 
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entrapped as a matter of law because the "Government [had] over­
stepped the line between setting a trap for the 'unwary innocent' 
and the 'unwary criminal,' and as a matter of law failed to establish 
that petitioner was independently predisposed to commit the 
crime."156 This was the Jacobson holding. The statement made by 
the Court in the penultimate paragraph of the opinion, that the en­
trapment defense should be applied when the court determines that 
the defendant was a "law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own de­
vices,"157 would not have perpetrated the crime, was not essential 
to the standard annunciated by the Court. The function of this 
phrase was to delineate the proper factual scenario for the subse­
quent application of the entrapment defense doctrine by the lower 
courts.158 
Therefore, the Hollingsworth court should have utilized the 
phrase "if left to his own devices"159 to determine whether the en­
trapment defense doctrine was applicable to Pickard and Hollings­
worth. This initial analysis was not carried out by the court. 
Instead, the Hollingsworth court improperly viewed the phrase "if 
left to his own devices" as a shorthand for the element of "readi­
ness." H this hypothesis is correct, then the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit would have had no real basis for its examina­
tion of the defen~ant's "position" as well as his "disposition" in the 
evaluation of the entrapment defense claim.160 
Since the court of appeals had found that Pickard and Hol­
lingsworth were "unwary innocents" who if "left to [their] own de­
vices"161 would not have perpetrated the crime, then, pursuant to 
Jacobson, the entrapment defense should have been applied with­
out any further analysis. The court's finding would have indicated 
that the defendants were not "independently predisposed" to com­
156. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 542 (quoting Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 
372 (1958». 
157. Id. at 553-54. 
158. The Jacobson majority stated: 

[W]e are "unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in en­

acting this statute that its processes of detection and enforcement should be 

abused by the instigation by government officials of an act on the part of per­

sons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish 

them." 
Id. at 553 (quoting SorreUs v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932». 
159. Id. at 553-54. 
160. For a discussion of the requirements of the entrapment defense, see supra 
part LB. 
161. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54. 
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mit the crime of money laundering,162 Thus, the phrase "if left to 
his own devices"163 was meant to act as a threshold test for the ap­
plication of the entrapment defense and not as the basis for a new 
element of the entrapment defense: the "readiness" requirement. 
C. The Role of ((Readiness" in the Entrapment Defense Doctrine 
1. 	 Readiness as a Relevant Factor in the Determination of 
Predisposition 
Even though the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
stated that Hollingsworth did not add a new element of "readiness" 
to the entrapment defense, its analysis of the entrapment defense 
was different before Jacobson. l64 For example, in United States v. 
Evans,165 the court indicated that predisposition could be assumed 
to be present in an individual who is induced to commit a crime 
without the use of grave threats, fraud, or "extraordinary 
promises-the sorts of promises that would blind the ordinary per­
son to his legal duties."l66 If this rationale were to be applied to 
Hollingsworth, then it would appear that the defendants' entrap­
ment defense would necessarily fail. The government agent, Roth­
rock, never threatened the defendants with physical injury or 
promised them that their conduct was legal. Rothrock did offer the 
defendants financial gains, but the amount received by Pickard and 
Hollingsworth would not have been sufficient, under the standard 
in Evans, to "blind the ordinary person."167 Therefore, it would 
appear that, prior to Jacobson, Hollingsworth and Pickard would 
have satisfied the Seventh Circuit's existing definition of predisposi­
tion and would have been convicted of their crimes. Under this 
interpretation, readiness or ability to commit the crime can be seen 
as one relevant, but not independent, factor in the predisposition 
162. Id. at 542. 
163. Id. at 553-54. 
164. Before Jacobson, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's analysis of 
the entrapment defense focused on the defendant's willingness to commit the crime. 
See, e.g., United States v. Cervante, 958 F.2d 175, 179 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that the 
most important factor in the predisposition analysis is whether the defendant demon­
strated any reluctance to engage in the criminal act); United States v. Manzella, 791 
F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that predisposition was equivalent to being 
"ready and willing" to commit the crime). 
165. 924 F.2d 714, 715-16 (7th Cir. 1991) (involving a conviction for a drug trans­
action where the defendant attempted to utilize the entrapment defense). 
166. Id. at 717. 
167. In all, the defendants together profited less than twenty thousand dollars 
over a six month period. United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1209 (7th Cir. 
1994). 
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analysis. Even if the government conceded the fact that Hollings­
worth and Pickard were not "ready" to commit the crime when 
they were first approached by the government agent, predisposition 
could still have been shown to have been present by a myriad of 
other factors.168 
2. Readiness Used as a Third Prong of Entrapment 
After Jacobson, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit required that the entrapment defense analysis spe­
cifically include a determination of whether the defendant was 
"ready" or in the "position" to commit the crime.169 Therefore, the 
court in Hollingsworth evaluated the defendants' personal back­
ground and sociological environment. The court found that Hol­
lingsworth and Pickard were not familiar or experienced with the 
money laundering business po Neither Hollingsworth nor Pickard 
had prior convictions for money laundering, nor did they move in 
the money laundering milieu. Therefore, they were not prepared to 
take the steps necessary to complete the actual crime without the 
government's assistance. This line of reasoning would appear to be 
flawed in Pickard's case.171 Pickard was able to efficiently and ef­
fortlessly carry out the money laundering process, even though he 
did not possess the devices that the majority suggested were prereq­
uisites to the commission· of the crime. 
A close examination of the significant events found in Hol­
lingsworth reveals the following: (a) the government induced Pick­
ard and Hollingsworth to commit a crime; (b) based on their lack of 
reluctance to launder money after being given the opportunity, 
Hollingsworth and Pickard appeared willing to commit the criminal 
act; (c) the defendants had no prior criminal records; (d) the de­
fendants had no experience or prior training in the field of interna­
tional finance, but they were still able to interest one investor in 
their banking venture; (e) the defendants' international banking 
business was failing and in desperate need of capital; and, most cru­
168. See discussion supra part 11.0. 
169. "Predisposition is not a purely mental state, the state of being willing to 
swallow the Government's bait. It has positional as well as dispositional force." Hol­
lingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1200. See supra part II.C. for a discussion of the positional and 
dispositional components of the entrapment defense. 
170. See United States v. Kussmaul, 987 F.2d 345, 349-50 (6th Cir. 1993) (familiar­
ity with the illegal act considered relevant to the determination of predisposition). 
171. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1202. The court stated that a professional money 
launderer must possess "underworld contacts, financial acumen or assets [and] access to 
foreign banks or bankers." Id. 
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cial, (f) the defendants actually did launder money for Rothrock on 
multiple occasions. l72 
Evaluating these. facts under the Jacobson analysis, it would 
seem that Hollingsworth and Pickard were predisposed to commit 
this crime. The government did not need to go to extreme lengths 
to induce their participation. The defendants were willing to com­
mit the crime and eager to establish a long-term money laundering 
relationship with Rothrock. Pickard admitted at trial that he pro­
posed the illegal money structuring transaction in his first telephone 
conversation with Rothrock. Additionally, the court found that it 
was the defendants who re-established contact with Rothrock after 
a six month interruption in the government investigation.173 Since 
these facts in the aggregate demonstrate that the defendants were 
predisposed to commit the crime prior to, and independent of, the 
government intervention, they should be sufficient to establish pre­
disposition according to Jacobson, and the entrapment defense 
should fail. 
Nevertheless, the majority in Hollingsworth stated that predis­
position was not established because the defendants could not be 
said to be "on the verge" of committing the criminal act when the 
government commenced the investigation.174 If the Hollingsworth 
court had utilized "readiness" as one of several factors pertinent to 
the determination of predisposition,175 but not as a separate and 
independent prong of the entrapment analysis, then these other fac­
tors would have clearly demonstrated the existence of predisposi­
tionP6 While the evidence that the government possessed before 
the commencement of the "sting" operation did not conclusively 
prove predisposition, it was sufficient to demonstrate predisposition 
when combined with evidence obtained during the course of the 
investigation. Therefore, the only reasonable explanation for the 
court's acquittal of the defendants is that the government failed to 
meet the new and independent prong of the entrapment defense 
172. Id. at 1201. 
173. Id. at 1207. 
174. Id. at 1203. The court stated that the entrapment defense would fail if "the 
defendant had the idea for the crime all worked out and lacked merely the present 
means to commit it." Id. 
175. See supra note 44 for a discussion of pertinent factors in the predisposition 
analysis. 
176. The courts have consistently held that the "most important [but not only] 
factor ... is whether the defendant evidenced 'reluctance to engage in criminal activ­
ity.''' United States v. Casanova, 970 F.2d 371, 375 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting United 
States v. Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 1985». 
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established by. the Hollingsworth majority: the "readiness" 
requirement.177 
If the "readiness" prong is included in the Hollingsworth anal­
ysis, then it is insufficient for the government to show that it had 
not gone to extraordinary lengths to induce the defendants' acts 
and that the defendants were willing and agreeable to perpetrate 
the crime. Under this new standard, the government would addi­
tionally have to prove that the defendants were "on the verge" of 
committing the crime before the government intervened. Thus, evi­
dence showing that the defendant was organized, prepared, trained, 
and equipped to commit the crime would be essential to establish 
this element. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit saw 
Hollingsworth and Pickard as inept neophytes who, if left to their 
own devices, would not have attempted to become international 
money launderersP8 The court simply did not believe that the de­
fendants' "devices," specifically their background, education, expe­
rience, and sociological environment, would have led them down 
the road of crime.179 Since the government could not establish 
readiness, it did not satisfy the new third prong of the test necessary 
to defeat the entrapment defense. 
D. 	 Consequences of the Hollingsworth Decision on Sting 
Operations and on the Use of the Entrapment Defense 
1. Public Policy Considerations 
The entrapment defense was designed to protect individuals 
who would likely not have committed a crime, were it not for the 
governmental interference in their lives.18o A sting operation is 
used to alter the timing of an offense so that a criminal can be 
caught and the public protected, not to create a lure that would 
catch the "unwary innocent."181 The courts have always held that, 
in order for a defendant to be held criminally responsible for an 
illegal act, the defendant must have had the "ability or power" to 
control his or her own conduct. This concept is demonstrated in the 
legal system's acceptance of defenses such as diminished capacity, 
insanity, and coercion.182 Similar to the entrapment defense, these 
177. 	 See Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1214 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
178. 	 [d. at 1202. 
179. 	 [d. 
180. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1992); Sorrells v. United 
States, 287 U.S. 435,441 (1932). 
181. 	 Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553. 
182. 	 See, e.g., United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1984) 
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doctrines suggest that, in some manner and to varying degrees, the 
defendant is not completely responsible for the formation of the 
mens rea and the commission of the actus reus.183 Therefore, 
courts are willing to acquit a criminal if it can be said that the crimi­
nal did not independently formulate the required criminal intent. 
This safeguard is one that American jurisprudence has utilized to 
protect the innocent.184 
On the other hand, it is evident that the law enforcement com­
munity must enforce the criminal laws in order to prevent chaos in 
our society. To further this end, courts have given the police con­
siderable leeway in using undercover agents to detect and halt 
crime.t85 One successful technique that has been used is the under­
cover "sting" operation. Such operations are not meant to incrimi­
nate innocent individuals, but instead to alter only the timing of the 
offense so that the suspect can be apprehended.186 As the court 
said in Hollingsworth, "[t]he defense of entrapment reflects the 
view that the proper use of the criminal law in a society such as ours 
is to prevent harmful conduct for the protection of the law abid­
ing."187 Thus, the courts must balance these competing interests 
and devise a rule that will protect the innocent, while still allowing 
the government to punish the gUilty. The entrapment defense and 
particularly the element of predisposition was contemplated to 
properly separate the "unwary innocent" from the "unwary crimi­
nal."188 The "readiness" prong added by the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit would appear to have upset this delicate 
balance. 
(discussing the defense of duress); People v. Wetmore, 583 P.2d 1308, 1312 (Cal. 1978) 
(discussing the relation between insanity and culpability); People v. Newton, 87 Cal. 
Rptr. 394, 407 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (discussing diminished capacity and the uncon­
sciousness defense). 
183. Mens rea has been defined as the "guilty mind" or the level of mental culpa­
bility necessary to be convicted of a crime. PHIlLIP E. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL LAW 4 (4th 
ed.1990). Actus reus is defined as the "guilty act" or "the physical aspect of the crime." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 35 (6th ed. 1990). 
184. See, e.g., Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988); State v. Powell, 
726 P.2d 266 (Haw. 1986). See generally, W.H. Johnson, III, Note, Proving a Criminal 
Predisposition: Separating the Unwary Innocent from the Unwary Criminal, 43 DUKE 
L.J. 384 (1993) (discussing the requirement of an independent criminal predisposition 
as part of the criminal act). 
185. See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,441 (1932) ("Artifice and 
stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises."). 
186. United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1203 (7th Cir. 1994). 
187. Id. 
188. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1992). 
330 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:303 
2. 	 The Detrimental Effect That the "Readiness" 

Requirement Will Have on Law Enforcement 

As was stated in the dissenting opinions in Hollingsworth,189 
allowing readiness to become an independent element of the en­
trapment defense will be extremely burdensome for the law en­
forcement community. It will create a new obstacle that the 
government will have to satisfy, above and beyond the requirement 
of proving predisposition. The government will not only have to 
prove what the defendant did and how it was done, but also what 
"devices" enabled the defendant to commit the criminal act.190 
This approach will allow defendants who had the mens rea and who 
have subsequently committed the actus reus to escape culpability 
simply because they were not initially "ready" when the govern­
ment offered them the opportunity to act. 
It would seem that disorganized neophyte criminals would be 
immune from prosecution under the Hollingsworth analysis simply 
because they were not yet skilled practitioners of the criminal act. 
Further, the competent and skilled lawbreaker who is "sufficiently 
studied in his way of doing business, so as to appear not too organ­
ized," will benefit from the court's analysis.191 Since a defendant's 
prior criminal record as well as previous associations with known 
criminals is a strong indication of "readiness," this new requirement 
will allow the criminal who is apprehended for the first time to es­
cape conviction. This will permit clever defendants to use the guise 
of stupidity or naivete as a defense to their crime.192 Readiness, as 
an independent requirement to the entrapment doctrine, would 
contravene both American criminal jurisprudence and our societal 
goal of punishing the blameworthy. 
189. See discussion supra part 11.0. 
190. In discussing the necessity of undercover sting operations Professor Herbert 
Packer stated: "Officials in the justice system are considered to be not only trustwor­
thy, but also in need of maximum flexibility if they are to be successful in bringing crime 
under control." HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 160-61 
(1968). 
191. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1217 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
192. Claims of stupidity or naivete have been commonly presented to the courts 
as explanations for a defendant's conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 927 F.2d 
999, 1004-05 (7th Cir. 1991) (defendant claimed that she was too unsophisticated to 
commit the crime); United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333, 334 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting 
defendant's claim of total unsophistication as a mitigating factor for his criminal 
behavior). 
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IV. PROPOSAL: UTILIZATION OF THE "TOTALITY OF TIlE. 





The majority in Hollingsworth concluded that Jacobson stood 
for the proposition that predisposition goes beyond the mental state 
of the defendant.193 In describing the proper use of the entrapment 
defense, the Jacobson Court held that predisposition must be estab­
lished before and independent of the government investigation. 
Additionally, the Court indicated that the entrapment defense 
should be implemented when it would appear that inducement was 
used on a "law abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely 
would have never run afoul of the law."194 This phrase, when read 
in conjunction with the Court's finding that the government "over­
stepped the line between setting a trap for the 'unwary innocent' 
and the 'unwary criminal, '" 195 suggests that the Court is perhaps 
becoming more amenable to considering "objective approach" evi­
dence as part of its entrapment defense analysis. This new test can 
be termed the "totality of the circumstances approach. "196 The to­
tality of the circumstances approach focuses on all the circum­
stances of a particular case, rather than on anyone factor in 
particular.197 
When evaluating a defendant's predisposition, courts will not 
limit their scrutiny solely to the conduct of the law enforcement 
agency. Similarly, the courts will not condone police behavior that 
193. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1199. 
194. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1992). 
195. Id. at 542. 
196. Courts are familiar with the "totality of the circumstances" determination, as 
this test is used often in criminal procedure. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
23()"31 (1983) (the totality of the circumstances must be evaluated to determine prob­
able cause). 
It should also be noted that the "totality of the circumstances" approach would 
coincide with the government's internal guidelines for undercover op!!rations, which 
provide that the government should not provide a suspect with an inducement unless: 
(a) There is a reasonable indication, based on information developed through 
informants or other means, that the subject is engaged, has engaged, or is likely 
to engage in illegal activity of a similar type; or (b) the opportunity for illegal 
activity has been structured so that there is reason for believing that persons 
drawn to the opportunity, or brought to it, are predisposed to engage in the 
contemplated illegal activity. 
Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 549 n.2 (quoting Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Under­
cover Operations (Dec. 31, 1980), reprinted in S. REp. No. 682, 551 (1982» (emphasis 
added). 
197. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39. 
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t~ey deem outrageous or excessive.198 While the courts see willing­
ness to act or an absence of reluctance on the part of the defendant 
to commit the crime as an important factor in the predisposition 
analysis, it should not be considered as the determinative factor,199 
As part of the evaluation of predisposition, the courts also look at 
the criminal background of the defendant and the defendant's "po­
sition" or "readiness" to commit the crime.2oo While all these ele­
ments' are essential for a comprehensive determination of 
predisposition, no one factor should be an independent element of 
the entrapment defense. 
The "totality of the circumstances" approach has been criti­
cized by some commentators as being too vague and general,201 
Other commentators have said that this approach permits courts to 
come up with results that promote law enforcement at the expense 
of individual rights.202 However, a thorough review of all the cir­
cumstances surrounding the governmental inducement and the sus­
pect's illegal conduct would provide the fact finder with a complete 
picture of the alleged entrapment. Utilizing the totality of the cir­
cumstances test, the fact finder would be able to take all the miti­
gating circumstances of the situation into consideration. The 
absence of one factor, such as readiness, would then be balanced 
against the presence of the defendant's willingness to commit the 
crime and the extent of the inducement needed to provoke this con­
duct. Also, as part of the totality of the circumstances approach, 
the fact finder should attempt to determine the likelihood that the 
defendant would have committed the crime if the government had 
not intervened. If the fact finder discovers that the circumstances, 
198. See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992). See generally, Fee­
ney, supra note 17, at 1030-33 (discussing judicial scrutiny of excessive governmental 
intervention in "sting" operations). 
199. See, e.g., United States v. Kussmaul, 987 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Tejeda, 974 F.2d 210, 217-18 (1st Cir. 1992). 
200. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd on 
other grounds, 476 U.S. 734 (1986). 
201. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
§ 3.3, at 143-45 (2d ed. 1992) (criticizing the totality of the circumstances test for not 
providing a concrete and specific framework for determining culpability). 
202. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977). See also Edward G. Mascolo, Prob­
able Cause Revisited: Some Disturbing Implications Emanating from Illinois v. Gates, 6 
W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 331 (1983). 
In his dissent in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,290 (1983), Justice Brennan criti­
ci.zed the totality of the circumstances test and stated that this standard presents "an 
overly permissive attitude towards police practices in derogation of the rights secured 
by the [Constitution]." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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in the aggregate, show no predisposition, then the entrapment de­
fense should be held valid. The burden would still rest on the gov­
ernment to show that predisposition existed beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
An analogous use of the totality of the circumstances approach 
can be found in the United States Supreme Court's analysis of 
probable cause.203 In United States v. Gates, the Supreme Court, in 
determining whether a law enforcement officer had sufficient justi­
fication to conduct a search or seizure, evaluated all the events sur­
rounding the incident, including the defendant's criminal 
background and the probability that a criminal act would have been 
committed. The Court believed that the use of a flexible approach 
to evaluate probable cause was necessary to accurately analyze this 
fluid concept.204 Similarly, due to'the variance in factual scenarios, 
modes of governmental inducement, and individual traits prevalent 
in an entrapment defense analysis, no one rigid test could possibly 
suffice. A standard that permits the fact finder to consider 'all the 
circumstances and make an informed decision is required. 
If the totality of the circumstances approach had been applied 
to the facts of Hollingsworth, the defendants' entrapment defense 
would have failed. It could be argued that the defendants might not 
have been "ready" to commit the crime due to their unsophisticated 
criminal background and foolish nature. However, the facts, as 
found by the jury, confirmed that:.(a) the government's inducement 
was clearly not excessive; (b) the defendants eagerly entered into 
the criminal activity; (c) the defendants suggested the criminal ac­
tivity to the government agent; and (d) the defendants were so des­
perate for capital that it was likely that they would have engaged in 
a similar crime if given the opportunity. Therefore, when the 
events surrounding the sting operation are viewed collectively, Hol­
lingsworth and Pickard would be unable to hide behind the protec­
tive shield of the entrapment defense. 
203, Gates,462 U.s. at 232. In Gates, the Court balanced all the circumstances 
related to an informant's tip in order to determine if the government's evidence had 
met the required level of suspicion. The Court held that balancing all the circumstances 
in the aggregate was necessary since "probable cause is a fluid concept- turning on the 
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts- not readily, or even usefully, 
reduced to a neat set of legal rules .... [One] simple rule will not cover every situa­
tion." Id. 
204. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
The entrapment defense is one of the safeguards built into the 
criminal justice system to protect the law-abiding citizen. Courts, 
however, have been unable to agree on an appropriate definition of 
a critical element of this defense, the lack of predisposition. While 
the Supreme Court's decision in Jacobson helped define the proper 
time to evaluate predisposition and the proper factual situations to 
which this defense should be applied, controversy has arisen regard­
ing its effect on the definition of predisposition. Relying on Jacob­
son, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 
Hollingsworth held that the entrapment defense contained a "readi­
ness" component. The court reasoned that predisposition had posi­
tional as well as dispositional force. Based on this interpretation, it 
ordered judgment of acquittal for two defendants convicted of 
money laundering because they were not prepared to take the steps 
necessary to commit the crime at the time the government first in­
tervened. The court held that the defendants were neophytes who 
were incapable of money laundering without governmental assist­
ance. Thus, the court ignored the defendants' willingness and ea­
gerness to engage in criminal activity. 
An analysis of the facts in Hollingswonh reveals that the court 
of appeals reformulated the entrapment defense by adding "readi­
ness" as an independent element to this doctrine. This new prong 
of the entrapment doctrine allowed the two suspects to go free, 
even though they possessed both the mens rea and the actus reus 
required to be found criminally culpable. Therefore, the Hollings­
worth majority acquitted two defendants whom many courts would 
have convicted. This result emphasizes the need for a new and 
standardized approach to predisposition. 
Courts should adopt a "totality of the circumstances" approach 
when attempting to evaluate predisposition. This approach would 
consider all the factors surrounding the governmental inducement 
and the defendants' commission of the act in the aggregate. While 
no one element would be determinative, the fact finder, utilizing 
this approach, would be able to conduct an informed and fair in­
quiry into the existence of predisposition prior to the government's 
intervention. The totality of circumstances test would not only effi­
ciently separate the "unwary innocent" from the "unwary crimi­
nal," but it would also eliminate an unnecessary burden on the law 
enforcement community in its attempt to protect society. Under 
the totality of the circumstances test, the neophyte money laun­
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derer, just like any other criminal, would find no protection from an 
entrapment defense. While the law-abiding innocent must go free, 
the culpable malefactor must be incarcerated: 
Elliot Rothstein 
